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YOUR SOUND OR MINE?: THE
DIGITAL SAMPLING DILEMMA
A basic tenet of the copyright clause in the United States Con-
stitution fosters the creativity of individuals by affording them
protection from the appropriation of their work.' Although quite
broad in its terms, nothing in the copyright provision demands
uniqueness or novelty within the subject matter sought to be copy-
righted.2 Additionally, the freedom of speech and press clause of
the first amendment of the Constitution encourages a myriad of
expressions.' However, by also establishing a property interest in
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright clause provides in pertinent part that Con-
gress shall have the power "Itlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id. The copyright provision in article I combines the substan-
tive power of Congress to grant copyright protection to the creator of a work with a spe-
cific constitutional objective of promoting scientific and artistic progress. Id. See A. LATMAN,
THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 15 (5th ed.
1979).
It follows that the copyright provision is based on the economic philosophy that "encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' " Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The copyright belonging to "authors has been solemnly ad-
judged .. .to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal
reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, with the
claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 U. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
The traditional notions underlying the copyright law continue to emanate through mod-
ern day legislation which recognizes that copyright protection is a necessary condition to
promote the level of creativity necessary to benefit the public. See Twentieth Century Mu-
sic Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). The Court in Twentieth Century reiterated the well
settled principle that "[tihe immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good." Id. at 156. See also Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (copyright protection is "economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas"); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (copyright protection intended to motivate creative activity of authors by
provision of special reward). See generally I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 1.031A] (1988).
2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, I I 
U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) ("original" with regard to copyright means work owes its origin to
particular author); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (copyright valid without re-
gard to subject matter's novelty); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 101
(2d Cir. 1951) (legislation imposes minimal standards in copyright cases because nothing in
Constitution dictates material seeking copyright protection be unique or novel); see also A.
LATMAN, supra note 1, at 20 (no minimal constitutional standards for copyright material).
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The first amendment provides in pertinent part that: "Congress
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a work, copyright protection created a paradoxical tension be-
tween an individual's right to freedom of expression and the pro-
hibition against using another artist's copyrighted work." The
confusion was exacerbated by the extensive history and compre-
hensive revisions of former copyright legislation,' which inevitably
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ." Id. The
liberty interest protected under the first amendment guarantees free speech and press by
prohibiting improper restraints on voluntary expression. See Estate of Hemingway v. Ran-
dom House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778 (1968). See
generally Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970) (discussing balance between protective rights to crea-
tive ideas and freedom of expression).
' See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). A copy-
right interest insures the creator a right to sell the copyrighted material and to receive fair
compensation for the labor invested. Id. Therefore, copyright protection provides the nec-
essary economic incentive for a creator to produce valuable copyrightable material and
protect such material from commercial appropriation. Id. See generally I M. NIMMER, supra
note 1, at § 1.10[A]-[B; Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment, Where Lies the Public
Interest?, 59 TUL L. REV. 135 (1984) (discussing public dissemination under fair use
doctrine).
Because of the dichotomy between the first amendment encouraging free communica-
tion and the 1976 Copyright Act protecting an author's expression, the Supreme Court has
employed a balancing test between society's beneficial interest in the speech sought to be
protected and the individual's countervailing property interest to protect a copyright. See
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. In Harper & Row, the Court stated that there must be "a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting
free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." Id. The Court
further stated that a copyright only protects an author's form of expression and not the
facts or ideas that were expressed. Id. Thus, there exists a "definitional balance under
which ideas per se fall on the free speech side of the line, while the statement of an idea in
specific form, as well as the selection and arrangement of ideas, fall on the copyright side
of the line." I M, NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 1.10[B].
' See H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNING REGISTRATION AND PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT WORKS, INCLUDING PRINTS AND
LABELS 1-10 (3d ed. 1952). The entire scheme of copyright law is a product of English law,
dating back to the time when the printing press was invented, allowing literary and artistic
works to be reproduced for circulation. Id. at 1-2. In 1556, a royal decree established com-
mercial monopolies, called the Stationers' Company, to oversee the whole printing busi-
ness. Id. In 1694, the ban on unlicensed printing was dispensed with and the Statute of
Anne established the first law to recognize a property right of authors in their work. Id. at
2-3. The Act of 1790 assured protection to an author or his assignees of any "book, map
or chart" for 14 years, with a privilege of renewal. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, I Stat. 24
(1790).
The following years produced drastic revisions and enlarged the scope of protection. See
H. HOWELL, supra, at 5-6. A subsequent revision of the Act of 1870, encompassed all
amendments to the 1790 Act, and centralized the copyright process in the Library of Con-
gress. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). Thereafter, the Copyright Act
of 1909 expanded existing copyright law in the United States: however, poor draftsman-
ship resulted in a lack of clarity and cohesiveness in sections throughout the Act. See A.
LATMAN, supra note 1, at 9. Furthermore, there existed a lack of uniformity in its applica-
tion to the cases. Id.
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led to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976.6
Digital sampling is the borrowing of pre-recorded sounds
through the use of a digital synthesizer to ultimately create a new,
"original" sound recording.' Although this practice has become
one of the most controversial issues in modern copyright law,
courts have been silent on whether or not sampling constitutes
copyright infringement. 8 It is submitted that without legislative
Regardless of the revisions of the copyright law in the 1909 Act, subsequent develop-
ments in motion picture, radio, phonographic and television technologies created new
problems. A. LArMAN, supra note 1, at 9. Finally, after the 1952 Universal Copyright Con-
vention treaty, recommendations from both the Register of Copyrights and the exhaustive
House and Senate hearings, the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted and forms the basis of
copyright law in the United States today. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
- 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
' See 'Sampling' Raises Hot Legal Issues, 6 ENT. LAW & FIN. 1 (1988) Ihereinafter Legal
Issuesj. Digital sound sampling allows any sound to be recorded and subsequently manipu-
lated by computer to generate the borrowed sound in new contexts. See Pareles, Digital
Technology Changing Music: Who's the Owner of a Tune "Cloned" from Single Note?, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at C23, col. 4. "Sampling can be compared to cloning an entire
organism from a single cell." Id. Furthermore, sampling devices enable musicians to "bor-
row" instrumental or vocal sounds of another artist which may represent the personal style
or a type of "signature" of that artist. Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is it Theft? Technology Raises
Copyright Questions, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1. According to some commentators, digi-
tal sampling is a catalyst of "musiclall plagiarism, capable of aiding and abetting an in-
fringement lof a musician's work] by sampling sounds from one sound-recording and re-
producing them in straight forward or derivative formats on a second sound recording."
Goldberg & Bernstein, Music Copyrights and the New Technologies, 199 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1988).
Ultimately, the only limitations to digital sampling are those of the artist's imagination. Id.
at 2.
Digital sound sampling is accomplished through the use of digital synthesizers, which can
store sounds by analyzing them into distinct component parts and then translating each
component into separate binary numerical values. B. SCHRADER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ELECTRo-ACOUSTIC MusIc 140-58 (1982). See generally C. DODGE & T. JERSE, COMPUTER MU-
SIC: SYNTHESIS, COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE (1985) (describing process of digital sound
sampling): R. RUNSTEIN, MODERN RECORDING TECHNIQUES (1974) (same).
' See Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 1. Although sampling has become one of the most
controversial areas of copyright law, the courts have not decided whether sampling is a
form of infringement because most claims have been settled. Id. See, e.g., Island Records,
Inc. v. Next Plateau Records, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 8165 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1987) (defendants
agreed not to distribute records and to recall records previously distributed): Thomas v.
Diamond, No. 87 Civ. 7048 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1987) (action against Beastie Boys over use
of samples in their album "Licensed to Ill"). Presently, however, cases are pending in
which various forms of sampling are claimed to be copyright infringement. See Castor v.
DefJam Records, No. 87 Civ. 6159 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1987) (where David Earl Johnson's
distinct conga sound was sampled by Jan Hammer's synthesizer and used in theme from
"Miami-Vice").
For an analysis of the approaches taken by the courts with respect to the closely related
issue of musical plagiarism, see Metzger, Name that Tune: Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of
Musical Plagiarism, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 139 (1987).
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action or judicial attention, the increasing use of digital sampling
will result in economic hardship for artists. It is also submitted
that a further disadvantage will be the listening public's inability
to recognize individual artists.
This Article will focus directly on the controversy generated by
digital sampling and its effects upon the entertainment industry.
Furthermore, it will examine the common law, state and federal
copyright laws, privacy statutes and the Lanham Act. It will pro-
pose that the common law of copyrights, as enforced by the states,
is best suited for resolving the sampling dilemma. Finally, this Ar-
ticle will set forth possible defenses to a sampling claim.
I. THE SAMPLING CONTROVERSY: ITS EFFECTS ON THE MUSIC
INDUSTRY
Digital sampling may be successfully undertaken anywhere,
from a state-of-the-art recording studio 9 to the basement of a
home.' 0 Depending upon the instruments sampled, a digital sam-
pler can generate sounds ranging from a simple solo melody to an
orchestral ensemble." Once a sample is stored in digitally ana-
lyzed components, the sound can be manipulated, perfected and
sold."2
As a result of the simplicity of this form of appropriation, digital
' See Blauner, Free Samples?, FAST TRACK, Oct. 20, 1986, at 32; see also Dupler, supra
note 7, at 74 (sampling conga drums in recording session). In an interview of musician
David Earl Johnson, conducted by Steven Dupler, Johnson explained how he "exchanged
favors" in the recording studio with synthesist Jan Hammer while Hammer was writing the
theme to the television hit series 'Miami-Vice." Id. (quoting Johnson). Johnson stated, "He
[Hammer] helped me mix a tune, and I let him sample my congas and some very unique
80-year-old African drums with the Fairlight, [a type of digital sampling device]." Id.
0 Neuman, An American Sampler, Artificial Intelligence, OMNI, May, 1988, at 20.
Neuman's investigations of digital sampling resulted in the discovery of a music program-
mer, who demonstrated how digital sampling makes stealing sounds possible in the privacy
of his basement. Id.
" Pareles, supra note 7, at C23, col. 2. The practical impact of sound sampling by a
sampler operator who has the power to electronically fabricate a performance of sounds
from "John Coltrane's saxophone, Gene Krupa's drums, Paul McCartney's electric bass,
Murry Perakia's piano and the voices of Enrico Caruso and Sarah Vaughan," is his or her
ability to formulate a composition in which these artists never contemplated. Id.
The first digital sampler, the Fairlight, appeared on the market in 1975, with an average
cost of $30,000. Id. at C23, col. 5. Now, as a result of the decline in cost of computer
memory chips, all the major keyboard manufacturers can afford to distribute digital sam-
piers at reasonable prices. Id. (quoting Dominic Milano, editor of KEYBOARD MAGAZINE).
12 Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic
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sound sampling has become both profitable and controversial
within the music industry.13
Because synthesizer operators appropriate the artists' original
sound works without fair compensation, one consequence of digi-
tal sampling may be that performing musicians will find them-
selves smothered by its adverse economic effects." According to
one commentator, "[w]ith the realistic sound of strings, winds,
orchestras and choirs at a single player's disposal, there is less
need to hire musicians on the individual instruments." 5 More-
over, the loss of the artists' professional identity and individual
recognition is inevitable because of the unlimited production ca-
pabilities of digital samplers.'
Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1725-26 (1987). Music programmers are
no longer merely perfecting sounds, but have progressed to building large libraries of indi-
vidual sounds. See Neuman, supra note 10, at 20. This abuse has resulted in a growing
black market of sampled music from which programmers build sound libraries with sounds
sampled from compact discs. Id.; see also Note, supra, at 1726 (describing growing number
of black market recording engineers who keep "libraries of samples to use in lieu of flesh
and blood performers"); DeCurtis, Who Owns a Sound?, Rolling Stone, Dec. 4, 1986, at 13
(popularity of sampling has created black market for digital samples). But cf. Pareles, supra
note 7, at C23, col. 6 (acknowledging that producer Trevor Horn, who sampled drum
sound of Alan White, drummer of rock group Yes, for composition "Beat Box" by The Art
of Noise, compensated Mr. White).
1" See Dupler, supra note 7, at 1 (digital sampling raises difficult copyright questions); see
also Note, supra note 12, at 1724 (sampling in music industry is as widespread as it is con-
troversial and damaging); DeCurtis, supra note 12, at 13 (sampling is pervasive recording
technique and litigation could proliferate if industry standards are not set).
" See Pareles, supra note 7, at C23, col. 4. Economically, sampling threatens the employ-
ment of studio and concert performers. Id. In reaction to Jan Hammer's sampling of David
Earl Johnson's playing of his conga drums, Johnson declared, "[i]f you listen to the theme
music [from "Miami-Vice"], you'll hear those congas and they're way up front. Jan wanted
those sounds because they're so unique. Now I'd like to get paid for that. He's got me and
my best sounds for life, and there's no compensation." Dupler, supra note 7, at 74 (quoting
Johnson). See generally Note, supra note 12, at 1726-27, ("[plerformers working hard to get
an edge in a competitive recording industry by using distinct, interesting sound find thleirl
exact sound appearing on competing recordings" for which they were never paid).
1" See Pareles, supra note 7, at C23, col. 4. "A single synthesizer player can replace sev-
eral acoustic musicians because he can hold trumpet, string, drum, bass and vocal sounds
all on a single floppy disk and thus undersell acoustic talent." Note, supra note 12, at 1726.
"e Dupler, supra note 7, at 74. An author has an interest in protecting his unique iden-
tity, not only where the general public is concerned, but also where the record producers
who hire performers are concerned. See Note, supra note 12, at 1726-30, 1738-43. This is
true because "instead of hiring one musician over another, producers are beginning to
select among competing samples." Id. at 1727.
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II. THE COPYRIGHT LAWS
A. Common Law Copyright and State Privacy Statutes
1. The Common Law
Common law copyright protection was perpetuated by the states
and extended to unpublished works at their inception.17
Upon publication, these common law rights terminated and the
only remaining protection had to be predicated upon federal stat-
utory copyright." In the past, this procedural requirement of
publication delineated the separation between common law pro-
tection and statutory protection for copyright.' The potentially
problematic dual system of copyright protection was virtually
eliminated with the addition of a preemption provision in the fed-
1 See, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912) (public representation of unpub-
lished play does not deprive owner of common law copyright); Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 345-46, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 776
(1968) (common law copyright applies to author's literary or artistic creation before work
made available to general public): Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 291, 171 N.E. 56, 59
(1930) (production of unpublished play was infringement redressable by common law doc-
trine of fair use).
Although most states protected the unpublished works of authors and artists under the
common law, California alternatively predicated protection of these works under statute.
See CAL. CIVIL CODE, § 980(a)(1) (Deering 1988) ("author of any original work of author-
ship that is not fixed in any tangible medium of expression has an exclusive ownership in
the representation or in the expression thereof").
IS See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834). The author under a common
law scheme maintained exclusive rights in his manuscript until publication, whereupon all
these rights terminated forever, unless he or she was in strict compliance with the copy-
right provisions governing rights to future publications. Id. at 664; see also Klekas v. EMI
Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1109, 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 300 (1984) (common law
rights pertaining to unpublished works will continue until creator allows "general" publica-
tion of his work): Hemingway, 23 N.Y.2d at 346 n.l, 244 N.E.2d at 254 n.I, 296 N.Y.S.2d
at 776 n.1 ("Although common-law copyright in an unpublished work lasts indefinitely, it
is extinguished immediately upon publication of the work by the author."). See generally A.
LATMAN, supra note 1, at 6 (exclusive rights terminate at common law upon publication
unless author abides by requirements of Copyright Act).
" See A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 65, 110. The concept of publication evolved under the
1909 Act largely in response to the dichotomy which existed between common law and
statutory copyright. I M. NiMMER, supra note 1, at § 4.01. In contrast to the 1909 Act,
where the courts were required to define the term through the use of case law, the current
Copyright Act defines "publication" as:
Itihe distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute cop-
ies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, pub-
lic performance, or public display constitutes publication. A public performance or
display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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eral Copyright Act.2" Consequently, the sole protection now af-
forded by the common law copyright doctrine inures to works
which do not constitute a "work of authorship" within the mean-
ing of the Copyright Act and works which are not fixed within a
tangible medium of expression 2 so as to satisfy the "writing" con-
dition of the Constitution.22 Therefore, works which do not fit
within the above federal categories are not preempted and are
properly protected under the common law.2" It is asserted that
since states have the power to provide protection to an unfixed
20 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). This preemption provision applies to rights asserted in
works "whether published or unpublished" and thus adopts a single system of federal statu-
tory copyright protection. Id. As a result of § 30 1(a), state law is preempted by federal law
and common law copyright is no longer applicable to "works of authorship that are fixed
in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by" the copyright law and fixed as of January 1, 1978. Id. This section exclusively
governs "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright ... ." Id. Consequently, any work which falls within
the statutory definition of "subject matter," and which is properly "fixed," is afforded its
sole protection under the terms of the federal law. Id.
If the work is not properly "fixed," nor the proper "subject matter" in accordance with
the terms of the statute, it is immune from federal preemption and afforded copyright
protection under the common law. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1982). Section 301(b)(1) pre-
served certain "rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any state" with
respect to "subject matter that does not come within the subject matter" defined by the
statute as "including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium" or with re-
spect to activity that does not violate the "exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright." Id. Therefore, the states have the power to protect certain works under the
common law doctrine of copyright. See generally I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 2.02
(discussing common law copyright protection).
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Section 102(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part that
"Iciopyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression ... from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated" and a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or communicated for a pe-
riod of more than transitory duration. Id.
22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The "writing" requirement under Article 1, section
eight compels a work to be of some tangible form capable of identification, thus recogniz-
ing "fixation" as a statutory condition, as well as a constitutional necessity. Id. Unless an
artist's work is reduced to tangible form, it cannot be recognized as a "writing" within the
text of the Constitution. See O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, 68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1946). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at §§ 1.08tAl, [C] (discussing liberal con-
struction given by courts to term "writings" but noting requirements of intellectual labor
and tangible form in order for work to constitute a writing).
2" See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Since federal protection would not
be applicable, common law protection would not conflict with any federal law, and grant-
ing power to the states to protect the works would encourage individuals to devote them-
selves to intellectual and artistic creations. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558-
59 (1973).
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work, any sound sampled from a "live performance" is the proper
subject of common law copyright protection. 4
Courts have recognized a common law property right in an art-
ist's voice25 and face 26 based on his unique style of performing.
2 7
2" See Note, supra, note 12, at 1744 (live performance not preempted and thus subject to
state law).
2 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). In Midler, the court
stated that a "voice is not copyrightable" and thus Midler's claim was not preempted by
federal copyright law. Id. at 462. The Ninth Circuit held that an advertiser's use of Bette
Midler's voice, performed by a sound-alike as part of a commercial advertisement, consti-
tuted unauthorized misappropriation of Midler's property rights in her distinctive vocal
sound and paralleled the behavior of an average thief. Id. at 463-64. The court declared
that "Ithe singer manifests herself in the song. To impersonate her voice is to pirate her
identity." Id. at 463. Additionally, the court stated that the defendants invaded a proprie-
tary interest found within Midler's voice. Id. at 463-64.
While imitation of one's distinct sound constitutes an appropriation of another's prop-
erty which courts have deemed tortious conduct, imitation without identification will not
give rise to a cause of action. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 235-36 (1964) (need for capacity to identify and create confusion required for recov-
ery): Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1974)
(court indicated that as a matter of law, if "plaintiff is not identifiable . . . then in no sense
has plaintiffs identity been misappropriated nor his interest violated"); Price v. Worldvi-
sion Enters., 455 F. Supp. 252, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dicta) (mere imitation of unidentifi-
able voice does not constitute infringement), affd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); see also
Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (imitation alone
does not constitute unfair competition under New York law); Davis v. Trans World Air-
lines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (anonymous imitation of plaintiff's re-
corded performance does not give rise to cause of action).
" See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Woody Allen's
action against an advertising company and a "Woody Allen look-alike," who were both
involved in representing Allen's face in a commercial endorsement, the court noted that
the plaintiff had cultivated a valuable property interest in his unique public image. Id. at
622. The court declared that Allen had invested time and energy in manifesting a unique
performing style and recognized the appropriation of Allen's likeness for defendant's com-
mercial advantage. Id.
Courts in the past have held that attributes of a celebrity's identity are protected by the
common law. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilet, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835
(6th Cir. 1983) (celebrity has property interest in his identity that may be protected from
unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1357-59 (D.N.J. 1981) (liability for impersonating late Elvis Presley in paid
performances): Worldvision, 455 F. Supp. at 257 (liability for use of name and likeness of
Laurel and Hardy); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 622,
396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977) (liability for portraying Guy Lombardo based on
exploitation of property interest in his personality).
" See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. The Midler decision expanded the rights granted to per-
formers in look-alike cases to performers in sound-alike cases and increased the breadth of
application of the common law and privacy statutes. Speech by Felix Kent at Sardi's Res-
taurant (New York City), Partner at Hall, Dickler, Lawler, Kent & Friedman (November
11, 1988). Midler may ultimately result in an opening of the floodgates or a "pandora's
box" for actions which did not previously fit within the protection of existing law-e.g.
Jack Benny's routine of saying "well" while placing his hand on his chin and Michael Jack-
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Such claims were proper subjects of common law protection since
the artists were not claiming infringement based on copyright, but
merely infringement upon elements which cannot be "fixed in [a]
tangible medium" so as to be afforded protection under the Act.2"
It is asserted that, with respect to digital sampling, the federal
Copyright Act likewise fails to provide adequate protection to an
individual sound produced by an artist within a composition.29
Since courts have acknowledged a common law property right in
an individual's voice and face, it is submitted that by analogy the
same rights should be afforded to vocal artists and musicians who
invest their time to develop an individual and recognizable per-
forming style which is later consciously appropriated by digital
samplers.
2. State Privacy Statutes
It is suggested that a second action which may successfully be
asserted against digital samplers is based on a violation of a state's
right-of-privacy statute. One such statute, promulgated under the
son's single white glove. Id. In addition to recognizing a performer through a unique style
he maintains, there exists an "ability to recognize ... the distinctive chords and arrange-
ment styles of various groups and performers lwhichl is not limited to rock aficionados, but
is the shared vocabulary of an entire generation." Marks, The Bette Midler Case: Judiciary
Finally Listens to Sound Alike Claim, 200 N.Y.L.J. 7 (1988). Moreover, because artists have
expended the "sweat equity" in achieving distinction, they maintain a strong interest in
preventing look-alikes and sound-alikes from profiting by the commercial exploitation of
their unique style. Id.
An inherent element of the creative process is the fact that composers, artists and writers
develop new works that "bare the stamp of their own distinctive style . N.Y. Times,
Nov. II, 1988, at B5, col. 3. (quoting musician John Fogarty).
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). For a work to be considered "fixed" in order to receive
copyright protection, it must denote some capable form of identification with a permanent
endurance. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). The court in DeCosta declared that to the extent a creation
may be ineffable, it is ineligible for copyright protection. Id. From this it follows that one's
voice or face is not a proper candidate for copyright protection, but this must be distin-
guished from an owner's copyright interest in the underlying work the voice or face repre-
sents. I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 1.081c].
9 See generally DeCurtis, supra note 12, at 13 (while copyright laws protect specific per-
formances, it is unclear whether artist's sounds are protected); Dupler, supra note 7, at I
("Iclopyright laws only cover the sequence of notes in a composition, not the actual notes
within that sequence") (quoting William Krasilovsky, Esq.); Note, supra note 12, at 1727
(unfixed performance does not constitute "writing" under article 1, section eight and may
not be subject to copyright protection).
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California Civil Rights Code,3" includes a provision which prohib-
its the taking of one's "likeness, in any manner," for commercial
purposes." Similarly, the New York right-of-privacy statute pro-
tects against misappropriation of another's "name ... or picture"
for commercial or trade use; however, unlike the California stat-
ute, the New York statute does not explicitly include the term
"likeness" within the text." Notwithstanding the omission, courts
have included by implication the term "likeness" in the New York
statute in order to further the legislative intent to protect an art-
ist's proprietary right to profit from his or her own identity. 33 It is
30 CAl.. CIv. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1988).
I ld. The code prohibits the use of "another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner..." for commercial purposes without the individual's consent. Id.
Skepticism casts doubt upon the court's limiting the term "likeness" in the California pri-
vacy statute to visual images. Marks, supra note 27, at 7. Experts assert that the judiciary
today would be apt to determine that an entertainer is as readily identifiable from the
uniqueness of his voice, as from his own individual image. Id. But cf Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (actress Shirley Booth precluded
from asserting sound-alike claim against defendant using Booth's voice in commercial).
Copyright experts suggest that the practice of digital sound sampling may be in violation
of state statutes which include the term "likeness" in the statute. Hollander & Dupler,
Digital Technology May Violate Copyright Law: Experts Doubt the Legality of Sampling, BILL-
BOARD, Aug. 9, 1986, at 4.
2 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1987). The code prohibits the unauthorized
use of "another's name, portrait or picture . . ." for commercial or trade purposes. Id. It
has been suggested that the terms "voice" and "likeness" were left out of the statute as a
possible legislative oversight, "since the possibility of reproducing and disseminating the
sound of a voice was not contemplated in 1903 when sections fifty and fifty-one were first
enacted." Onassis v. Christian-Dior, 122 Misc. 2d 603, 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
11 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 725-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (terms "por-
trait or picture," in New York privacy statute includes all recognizable representations of
an individual); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(actor had property rights in his name and likeness, which were inheritable by heir): Onas-
sis, 122 Misc. 2d at 608, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (noting that phrase "portrait and picture" in
section fifty-one was not restricted to actual photographs, but comprised any representa-
tions which are recognized as "likenesses" of individual). But see, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem.
Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962) (New York statute cannot protect infringement of
sound-alike because it is limited to "name, portrait or picture"); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane
& Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977) (court
deemed "right-of-privacy" statute cannot be construed to include "image" or "likeness").
Senator Emanuel Gold has introduced a bill currently under review in the New York
State Senate referred to as the "Celebrity Rights Act." N.Y.S. 6843, 211th Sess. (1988).
The effect of the bill would be to expand the protection of the New York Civil Rights
Code by the addition of the terms "voice" and "likeness." See generally Gordon & Honig,
The Celebrity Rights Act, 7 The Ent. and Sports Lawyer, (ABA FORUM ON THE ENT. & SPORTS
INDUS. (Summer/Fall 1988)); Marks, Granting Publicity Rights to Heirs Protects Performer's
Privacy Rights, MANHATTAN LAWYER, Apr. 12-18, 1988, at 13.
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submitted that a sampling claim, based on an individual's right to
profit from his own identity, as represented by his music, would
be successful under the state privacy statutes in New York and
California.
B. The Copyright Act of 1976
Despite the flexibility of common law copyright and state stat-
utes in combating the exploitations provoked by new technology,
it is necessary to focus on applicable federal law to determine the
extent of protection potentially afforded in the area of digital
sampling. The Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act")34 protects
"original works of authorship"35 which are "fixed in any tangible
-1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
35 Id. at § 102 (1982). Section 102 provides copyright protection to "original works of
authorship." Id. A prerequisite for copyright protection to be afforded to any type of sub-
ject matter is that the work must be "original." Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980). In defining the term "original," which both the 1909 Act and the
1976 Act fail to do, judicial construction has recognized that "originality" merely calls for
independent creation, not novelty. E. Mishan & Sons, Inc. v. Marycana, Inc., 662 F. Supp.
1339, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In addition, nothing in the Constitution demands unique-
ness or novelty in the copyrighted work. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976). A work may be deemed "original," even if it is
identical to a separate work, provided it was an independent creation by the author and
not copied from the original. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
According to Judge Learned Hand, the underlying principles as to what constitutes
"originality" would hypothetically lead to a situation in which "if by some magic a man
who had never known it were to compose a new Keats' Ode On a Grecian Urn, he would
be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). However, the liberal standard for copyright
protection will not substitute as justification for plagiarism. Id. at 56.
Under the copyright law, any "distinguishable variation" will constitute sufficient origi-
nality. Id. (citing Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102). "No matter how poor artistically the 'au-
thor's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 (citing Bleinstein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)) see also Gerlach-Barklow Co.
v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927) (distinguishable variation will protect
work from being copied, even if it has same theme). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note
1, at § 2.-2[B] (discussing degree of originality required under copyright act).
The meaning of "works of authorship" within the Act is not confined to its literal mean-
ing of "a writing" as evidenced by expressly enumerated protection for, "literary works;
musical works . . . dramatic works . . . pantomimes . . . pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works: motion pictures . . . and sound recordings." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). In addition,
the statute is flexible enough to include new forms of expression developed through tech-
nology. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) ("writ-
ing" as used in Constitution read expansively); Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80,
83 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (same). See
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medium of expression."36 By focusing on the statutory language
in light of the congressional view towards musical reproduction
and the courts' deferential perspective toward the Act, it is sub-
mitted that statutory copyright protects an artist against unlawful
sound sampling.
In order for an artist to successfully assert a claim under the
Act, he or she must demonstrate ownership, reproduction and
substantial similarity to the original work. The determination of
ownership is based upon whether the person claiming copyright
protection is the creator of the work. 7 If the artist is not the
copyright owner, any possible statutory protection afforded
against sound sampling will depend entirely upon whether the ac-
tual owner has an interest in protecting the musician or the devel-
opment of the sampling technique. 8 After ownership has been es-
tablished, it must be determined whether the alleged infringer has
in fact sampled the original artist's sound by merely altering the
sequence or quality of the original recording. 9 Ultimately, the
generally I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 2.03[A] (discussing meaning and interpretation of
"writing").
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). For a work to be considered "fixed," it must be "em-
bod[ied] in a copy or phonorecord . . . permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
Id. § 101. Accordingly, courts have determined that in order for a work to become pro-
tected under the statute, it must have at least some independent material form which is
identifiable and distinguishable. See, e.g., Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910
(2d Cir. 1980) (work must have "distinguishable variation from preexisting work"): Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 319-20 (1st Cir.) (work must be of some
identifiable form), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).
"' 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). The statutory copyright interest within a work "vests ini-
tially in the author or authors of the work." Id. Furthermore, an individual may be deemed
the owner of a work as an assignee of the author's rights. See Van Cleef & Arpels, Inc. v.
Schechter, 308 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Ripley v. Findlay Galleries, 155
F.2d 955, 957 (7th Cir.) (once author assigns his work, he or she gives up the right to claim
copyright protection), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 775 (1946); S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, THIS
BusINESS OF Music 65-66 (5th ed. 1985) (artist who is employee for hire never had copy-
right interest; artist can contract for higher percentage in royalties from producer in con-
sideration for his copyright interest). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 5[A]
(discussing possible theories of copyright ownership).
" See Note, supra note 12, at 1730. If the actual owner of the copyright is the record
company, the protection interests of the respective parties will ultimately differ because
after the record company weighs the "reduction of production costs offered by sampling
against the maintenance of good studio/musician relations .... its long-term interest lies in
protecting sampling rather than live musicians." Id. (footnote omitted).
39 See United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1974), affid in part, 540
F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977). In Taxe, the defendants re-
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artist must demonstrate that the sampler's act rises to the level of
unlawful infringement by proving that the resulting recording is
substantially similar and may be recognized as the same
performance."0
Congress and the courts have given some insight into their per-
ception of the inappropriate use of ar artist's work without com-
pensation. Through an examination of the legislative history un-
recorded the copyrighted compositions with changes in the speed of the sounds by deleting
certain frequencies and tones and adding sounds from a synthesizer. Id. The court stated
that "Itlo constitute an infringement, there must be a re-recording of more than a trivial
part of the copyrighted recording" and the final product must be recognizable as the same
performance as the original. Id. at 1017. The court held that despite changes of speed and
frequency in the re-recording, the final product was recognizable as the original perform-
ance, and therefore there was willful infringement of plaintiff's copyright protection. Id.
40 See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
1981) (where works have similarities which go beyond "mere generalized ideas or themes,"
infringement occurs); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.)("[njo plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pi-
rate"), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). But see Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co.,
675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982) ("defendant may legitimately avoid infringement by in-
tentionally making sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be regarded as sub-
stantially similar to that of the plaintiffs") (citation omitted).
The quantitative aspect of infringement is certainly important, however, if there is sub-
stantial qualitative copying, the alleged infringement may be deemed substantially similar.
See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 13.03 (A)(2). When the portion copied is of great
importance to the work as a whole, the copying can rise to a level of substantial similarity
because the value of the original work becomes substantially diminished. Id. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.) (recognizing doctrine of "frag-
mented literary similarity"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Universal Pictures Co. v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) (whole work need not be taken to
constitute copyright infringement; merely enough to diminish value of original): Werlin v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (copying can rise to level of
"fragmented literary similarity" and diminish value of work). Thus, the analysis of substan-
tial similarity must be both quantitative and qualitative. See Silverman v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 463-64.
For a discussion of the substantial similarity requirement for copyright protection of va-
rious musical compositions, see Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of
Substantial Similarity, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SyMp. (ASCAP) 81 (1977).
The determination of recognition for the purposes of substantial similarity is based on a
reasonable person standard. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685, 687 (1st
Cir. 1980) (standard used to measure substantial similarity is "ordinary reasonable per-
son"); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (sub-
stantial similarity is judged by ordinary observer standard); Silverman, 632 F. Supp at 1351-
52 (standard for substantial similarity is that of average lay person standard). But see Whe-
lan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986) (reasonable
observer test not appropriate for determining substantial similarity in computer programs),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for
Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385 (1981) (criticiz-
ing reasonable person standard). See generally Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas-A Judge's
Approach, 43 VA. L. REv. 375, 379-80 (1957) (discussing use of ordinary observer test).
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derlying compulsory licensing, it is apparent that Congress
intended to encourage different arrangements of the same song,
while still providing fair compensation to the original artist."' Fur-
thermore, to accommodate advancing technology, the courts have
shown great deference by interpreting the Act in broader terms.42
It is suggested that the proper method of analysis and applica-
tion of the Act to sampling depends upon the length and degree
of infringement of the original work to create the sampled mate-
rial. Indeed, some sampled segments are so short in duration and
dramatically altered that copyright protection cannot be afforded.
However, if the work remains recognizable as the original per-
formance, albeit slightly altered, then the sampled material com-
ports with the applicable criteria for copyright protection.
C. The Lanham Act
A final source of copyright law which may afford a viable source
of protection against the problems generated by digital sampling
is the Lanham Act.4" The protections of the Lanham Act, enu-
merated in section 43(a)," enable a plaintiff to sue for damages 5
"' See HR. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-75 (1967). As a result of congressional
discussion of the pros and cons of compulsory licensing, § 115 of the Copyright Act of
1976 was enacted. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a), (c) (1982). Section 115(a) provides in pertinent
part that when a musical work has been "distributed to the public ... under the authority
of the copyright owner, any other person may ... obtain a compulsory license to make and
distribute phonorecords of the work ..... Id. Subsection (c) of section 115 provides that
an owner is entitled to royalties from records made and distributed under subsection (a).
Id.
42 WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 627 (7th
Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir.)
(video games are "audio visual" works and thereby afforded protection under statute), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856-57 (2d Cir.
1982) (video game output deemed "fixed within a tangible medium of expression" despite
variations which occur with various players).
13 Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 105 1-
1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). For a summary of developments under the Lanham Act
and trademark law, see The United States Trademark Association Trademark Re-
view-Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 376-80 (1987).
" Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
states in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable to
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or injunctive relief"' for any "false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation" sufficient to confuse the pub-
. . . any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
Id.
Because the purpose of the Act was to protect individuals from unfair competition that
resulted from trademark or tradename infringement, past judicial interpretation restricted
its applicability. See Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671, 682-85 (1984).
Section 45 of the Act declares that among the Act's purpose is "to protect persons en-
gaged in ... commerce against unfair competition land] to prevent fraud and deception in
. . . commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or . . . imitations .
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
In 1954, the language of section 43(a) was given broader construction and protection
was extended to parties who were victims of deliberate and false representations. See
L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650-54 (3d Cir. 1954) (defend-
ant held liable for causing mistaken impression of plaintiff's product through use of mail
order). See generally Allison, Private Cause of Action for Unfair Competition Under the Lanham
Act, 14 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 4-6 (1976) (broad construction of § 43(a) protects against false
representations). Subsequently, this section was given further application. See, e.g., PPX En-
ters. v. Audio Fidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff afforded protec-
tion under § 43(a) because defendant marketed albums purporting to contain perform-
ances by Jimi Hendrix, when Hendrix was merely session performer); Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (section 43(a) extended protection to
plaintiff's comedy program which defendant presented to public in garbled form): Vuitton
Et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071, 1076-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (under sec-
tion 43(a) defendant barred from distributing imitation Vuitton handbags), affd, 622 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1980); Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516, 517-18(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendants liable for selling album purporting to contain principle re-
cordings by George Benson, who was merely background player). See also RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 761 (1939) (discussing civil liability of defendant who deliberately misrepresented
his goods as equal to another's); Comment, Injunctive Relieffor Trademark Infringement - The
Second Circuit Misses the Mark: Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 286, 286-89 (1988) (explaining application of Section 43(a) of Lanham Act).
' PPX Enters., 818 F.2d at 271. In order to establish a claim for damages, plaintiff must
demonstrate "actual consumer confusion or deception" through the use of direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence and testimony. Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay
Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff must prove public was actually
deceived to recover damages under section 43(a) of Lanham Act); DC Comics, Inc. v.
Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
"' See, e.g., PPX Enters., 818 F.2d at 271. In attempting to establish a claim for injunctive
relief, plaintiff must demonstrate a "likelihood of deception or confusion on the part of the
buying public caused by false description or representation." Id. (emphasis added). See
Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1982) (likelihood of
confusion or deception is necessary to obtain equitable relief); Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v.
Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 518 F. Supp. 607, 616 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (same), affd, 684
F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982).
A reasonable person standard must be proven in a § 43(a) action. See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon
v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (cause of action exists where con-
sumer test results deceive reasonably intelligent consumer); Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980) (statute demands only proof providing
reasonable basis for belief of likely injury).
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lic. 47 The critical inquiry in cases of consumer confusion is
whether the consumer was actually deceived, or was likely to be
deceived, by the defendant's product (i.e. sound or style), mistak-
ing it for the plaintiff's so as to entitle him to relief under the
Lanham Act.48 This deception may manifest itself from the utili-
zation of the originator's work to enhance the work of the in-
fringer, a concept commonly known as "reverse palming-off'. 49 It
is asserted that in cases of sound sampling, as in cases of sound-
alikes, there will be a mistake in identity as to the artist perform-
ing on the album sold in commerce, creating confusion to the
public and ultimately resulting in liability. It is further suggested
that an artist's sound or style can be so unique that it tends to
identify the same, and when sampled results in deception or con-
fusion of the public as to the "origin ' 50 of the sampled sound,
"7 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). A claim under this section does
not require "literal or obvious falsehood" nor any "intent to deceive" by the defendant.
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Cheseborough-Pond's, Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984).
It is clear that an imitation of a distinctive voice which ultimately results in public confu-
sion is actionable. See Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962). This
is true especially when the defendant causes a "mistake in identity, because "[sluch passing-
off is the basic offense." Id.
"s See, e.g., PPX Enters., 818 F.2d at 271. See Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618
F.2d 950, 955 (2d Cir. 1980) (consumers must be actually misled or confused as to origin
of goods), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982); D.C. Comics, 486 F. Supp. at 1279 (consumers
must be confused as to origin of products).
' Borchard, Reverse Passing Off-Commercial Robbery or Permissible Competition?, 67 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1, 1 (1977). Deception of the public can occur in two distinct forms, commonly
noted as "palming-off' and "reverse palming-off." Id. The former describes the more com-
mon type of deception where the defendant "passes off' his goods as those of his competi-
tors and thereby has falsely designated the origin of the goods. See American Home Prods.
Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-62 (D.N.J.) (defendant marketed
tablets resembling plaintiff's product "Advil" in color and texture creating likelihood of
confusion of public as to origin of pills), afl'd, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987). Reverse-palm-
ing off occurs when a defendant attempts to "pass-off' another's goods as his own. See John
Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (defendant's false
claim of affiliation with plaintiffs manufacture of mechanical penny banks caused consum-
ers to assume that defendant's inferior products belonged to plaintiff), affd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom., Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp. 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); Matsushita Elec.
Corp. v. Solar Sound Sys., 381 F. Supp. 64, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (defendant solicited
sales for portable radio by taking plainfiff's model and placing defendant's brand name on
it).
60 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). The phrase "false designation of
origin" within section 43(a) of the Act has been broadly construed by the courts to apply to
various aspects of the origin of goods. See, e.g., Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control
Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 939-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (prohibition against false designation of origin
may protect "passing-off' of non-distinctive term); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986) (in deciding likelihood of confusion, law
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thereby qualifying for relief under the Lanham Act.
III. POSSIBLE DEFENSES
A possible defense to a claim of sampling is that the result of
sound sampling represents a new and independent fixation, differ-
ent from the original and thus does not constitute infringement.5'
Furthermore, sound sampling may fall within the "fair use" ex-
ception of the Act.52
The Lanham Act does not prohibit "an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those
in the copyrighted sound recording."5 An "independent fixation
of sounds" occurs when there is a new performance of a sound, in
contrast to the mere "re-recording of the copyrighted fixation." '54
Thus, an individual accused of sampling infringement will ulti-
mately defend on the basis of "independent fixation," claiming
that to have a copyrightable work demands some type of
originality.5
should be liberally construed); Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 408
(6th Cir. 1963) ("origin" is liberally construed and therefore extends to identity of
manufacturer).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982). This possible defense is not without precedence because
under the prior copyright act limited copyright protection was afforded to sound record-
ings fixed after February 15, 1972. See I M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 35 (1975).
Under the relevant provisions, the copyright owner acquired the exclusive right to dupli-
cate, but this did not bar independent fixation by another of other sounds similar to those
copied. See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1040 (1977).
"2 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The fair use exception has been recognized as an affirma-
tive defense to a copyright infringement claim with approval by the courts. See, e.g., Harper
& Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1985) (analyzed factors of fair
use doctrine and found defense inapplicable); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1966) (privilege of fair use applies to certain copyrighted
works), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (appropriation of copyrighted work will not equate to liability if rea-
sonable or fair).
"ITIhe [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule of reason . . . and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts." H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 29
(1967). In determining the validity of a fair use defense however, courts have enumerated
several elements which should be examined to properly make this ad hoc determination.
See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, 540
F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
11 See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F. 2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (test of copyright
originality can be fulfilled by "merely trivial variation"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976);
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Regardless of whether or not the alleged infringement can be
classified as an independent fixation, courts have allowed the in-
substantial use of a work without permission."' "Fair use is a privi-
lege belonging to those who use another's copyrighted material in
a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the mo-
nopoly granted to the owner." 7 The scope of what constitutes
fair use will be determined by "(1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."58 It is asserted that in light of the factors enu-
merated above, sampling could fall under the fair use exception.
However, if so much of the original work is taken so that its value
is diminished to an injurious extent, or if the efforts of the origi-
nal author are significantly appropriated by another, that is suffi-
cient to constitute a piracy pro tanto.59
CONCLUSION
Focusing on the broad aspect of liberty granted by the first
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F. 2d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1951) (to fulfill
requirements for copyright author needs something recognizable as his own): E. Mishan &
Sons, Inc. v. Marycana, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1339, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (test requires
mere "independent creation not novelty").
" See, e.g., G.R. Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1967) (no copyright
infringement when copying judged to be de minimus); West Publishing Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1909) (some copying permitted if done to fair
extent): Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (literal
duplication was not infringement because it was de minimus). The question of whether or
not a sample containing a few notes rises to the level of substantiality or is merely de mini-
mus has not yet been litigated. See Note, supra note 12, at 1735.
1 Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting
H. BALI., COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967).
5- 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See, e.g., Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84-85
(1st Cir. 1981) (defendant's use of plaintiff's copyrighted work clearly affected plaintiff's
potential market, which violated fair use); Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307 (justification for fair
use privilege initially determined by nature of material); Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694
F. Supp. 483, 489-90 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (analysis of elements of fair use doctrine determined
defense inapplicable). See generally Fischer, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1661,1661 (1988) (analysis and criticism of fair use doctrine).
0" Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4901).
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amendment and the countervailing limits imposed by the copy-
right law, courts have successfully balanced the opposing interests
of a society that favors the right to free expression against an indi-
vidual's right to reap the benefits of his original creations. This
accomplishment was achieved through the common law and legis-
lation. Despite this success, modern technology and electronic in-
ventions are upsetting this balance by imposing a substantial eco-
nomic threat to the careers of musicians through the use of digital
sound sampling. Individuals who support sound sampling inappro-
priately claim that imitation is the most sincere form of flattery.6"
Defenders of sampling also claim that it should be viewed as a
"musical collage," which is merely the assembly of diverse frag-
ments and thus not an infringement.61 More accurately, digital
sampling involves the "use of the sweat of somebody elses' brow"
to reap the commercial benefits that are derived from public
recognition.62
Through the application of the relevant common law copyright
laws, along with case law and legislation used in situations analo-
gous to digital sampling, the challenges presented by sound sam-
pling can be successfully combatted and protection afforded in
cases of sampling infringement. If the existing legal avenues prove
inadequate, legislative action will be necessary to properly regu-
late sound sampling and to provide just compensation to sampled
artists.
Lori D. Fishman
, Marks, supra note 27, at 1. Some sampler operators claim that most musicians are
flattered to hear their sounds being used and do not see sampling outside a music tape-
session as an infringement. Dupler, supra note 7, at 74. In defense of sound sampling, one
technician claimed, "[tihe sound sources are out there - if you sample your dog or a bird
in a tree, is he entitled to copyright?" Id. (quoting Bobby Nathan, co-owner of Unique
Recording).
" Interview with Robert A. Weiner, Esq., Associate at Berger & Steingut and counsel to
Beastie Boys in digital sampling litigation, in New York City (Nov. 9, 1988). For a perspec-
tive on commercially benefiting from another's efforts, see Callmann, He Who Reaps Where
He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595
(1942).
"' Marks, supra note 27, at 7. See Dupler, supra note 7, at 74.
223

